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Thomas M. Madden* 
Significance and the Materiality Tautology 
I. Introduction 
The lack of a bright line test for materiality in securities fraud actions is 
not new.1 It now appears that perhaps the most likely opportunity for a bright line 
standard came and went with the Supreme Court’s Matrixx decision.2 
Commentators on the consequences to the business of securities fraud class actions 
have moved on to Halliburton3 and Amgen.4 Yet, for those of us concerned with the 
general understanding of materiality in private 10b-5 actions, Matrixx has reminded 
us of a terrible fog. 
Putting aside for now the narrower discussions of materiality as a class 
certification issue, and materiality as a function of fraud on the market reliance and 
causality, Matrixx has left us with a fundamental void in defining materiality. The 
terrible fog is the very definition of materiality. 
Materiality is a lynchpin element in a private cause of action brought for 
securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “‘34 
Act” or “Exchange Act”)5 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission” or “SEC”).6 Whether 
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 1. Donald C. Langevoort, F. Hodge O’Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium: The Future of Class 
Actions: Lies without Liars? Janus Capital and Conservative Securities Jurisprudence, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 933, 933 
(2012) (“[Matrixx] passed on an opportunity to rein in the otherwise fact-intensive approach to materiality on 
which defense motions to dismiss often stumble, and applied the heightened pleading requirement for scienter 
fairly liberally.”).  See also Richard A. Booth, The Two Faces of Materiality, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 517 (2013); James 
D. Cox, 19
th
 Annual Institute for Law and Economic Policy Conference: The Economics of Aggregate Litigation: 
Understanding Causation in Private Securities Lawsuits: Building on Amgen, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1719 (2013) 
(focusing on causation and the fraud on the market theory). 
 2. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011). 
 3. Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011). 
 4. Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013). 
 5. Securities Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 891 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C § 78j(b) (2012)). 
 6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities 
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information disclosed, misrepresented or withheld is material goes to the crux of 
the policy behind Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.7 That policy generally is to 
promote fair and efficient, fully informed markets in which the public can make 
investment decisions.8 Rule 10b-5 was promulgated pursuant to the grant of 
authority given to the SEC by Congress in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)).9 “By that Act Congress proposed to prevent 
inequitable and unfair practices and to insure fairness in securities transactions 
generally, whether conducted face-to-face, over the counter, or on exchanges.”10 If 
material information is misrepresented to the marketplace or is traded on by a 
select few without being disclosed, the policy will not be met.11 
A major source of redress for violations of Rule 10b-5 is, of course, the implied 
private right of action. Private actions under Rule 10b-5 are often brought as class 
actions,12 and, if so, are subject to the provisions of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995,13 as amended (the “PSLRA”) requiring pleading with 
particularity—a higher standard intended to reduce frivolous claims.14 
 
exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course 
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security.”). 
 7. I will refer principally to Rule 10b-5 and sometimes to Rule 10b-5 or Section 10(b) interchangeably, 
but it should be understood that this Rule invokes Section 10(b) more generally.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
 8. See generally JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 39–40 (3d ed. 2003). 
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
 10. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847–48 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 11. For a specific discussion of 10b5-1 plans, see Stanley Veliotis, Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans and Insiders’ 
Incentive to Misrepresent, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 313 (2010).  For a discussion on insider trading and the policy of 
private actions, see generally Robert A. Prentice & Dain Donelson, Insider Trading as a Signaling Device, 47 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 1 (2010). 
 12. See Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465 (2004) (discussing 
the benefit of the class action regime and contemplating its application in Korea); see also Roberta Romano, The 
Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 57 (1991) (arguing that “differential 
indemnification rights, insurance policy exclusions, and plaintiffs’ counsel as the real party-in-interest create 
powerful incentives for settlement”); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do 
Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Action?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 855–65 (2002) 
(examining the role of institutional investors in both prosecuting securities class actions and filing claims in 
class settlements post-PSLRA). 
 13. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2012). See also Fed. R. Civ. 9(b). 
 14. See Joseph De Simone, Matthew D. Ingber & Evan A. Creutz, Practitioner Note: Asher to Asher and Dust 
to Dust: the Demise of the PSLRA Safe Harbor?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 799 (2005); see also Cox & Thomas, supra 
note 12, at 855–65 (examining the role of institutional investors in both prosecuting securities class actions and 
filing claims in class settlements post-PSLRA); In re Suprema Specialties, Inc., Sec. Litig., 438 F.3d 256, 276 n.8 
(3d Cir. 2006) (“The purpose of the heightened pleading requirements contained in the PSLRA is to restrict 
abuses in securities class-action litigation.”); Greebel v. FTP Software, 194 F.3d 185, 191 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The 
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To prevail in a private action for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff 
must successfully show that: (1) a defendant made a material misrepresentation or 
omission, (2) that the defendant acted with scienter,15 (3) a connection exists 
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security, 
(4) the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation or omission,16 (5) the plaintiff 
consequently suffered economic loss, and (6) the defendant’s material 
misrepresentation or omission caused an economic loss to the plaintiff (“loss 
causation”).17 
Our concern, at a time when our Supreme Court remains interested in Rule 10b-
5, is with the crucial materiality element, and, more particularly, with recent 
decisions regarding the usage and meaning of “significance” in finding materiality.18 
II. Significance and Materiality 
Determining materiality involves “a mixed question of law and fact.”19 Under Basic 
v. Levinson,20 a decision maker must disclose information where “a substantial 
likelihood that the disclosure of the [would be] omitted fact would have been 
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of 
information made available.”21 
This article addresses the usage and meaning of forms of “significance” and 
their, or its, linkage to the determination of materiality in deciding whether to 
disclose is tied to disclosure and liability under Rule 10b-5.22 Moreover, it explores 
whether the usage and meaning of forms of “significance” existing in precedent and 
determinative of decision making on materiality, have been altered in view of the 
 
enactment of the PSLRA in 1995 marked a bipartisan effort to curb abuse in private securities lawsuits, 
particularly the filing of strike suits.”); In re Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 544, 556 (E.D. Tex. 2004). 
 15. “[A] mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. . . .” Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976). See also Michael J. Kaufman, Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection 
Conference: Foreword: Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1323 (2013); Barbara 
Black, Behavioral Economics and Investor Protection: Reasonable Investors, Efficient Markets, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
1493 (2013). 
 16. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s treatment of the reliance element, see Robert A. Prentice, 
Stoneridge, Securities Fraud Litigation, and the Supreme Court, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 611 (2008). 
 17. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc., v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011); Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. 
v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2011); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 
148, 157 (2008); see also Robert A. Prentice, Behavioral Economics Applied: Loss Causation, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1509 (2013). 
 18. Through emphasizing precedent in private actions, this analysis also draws upon instructive 
discussions of materiality in criminal and civil cases. 
 19. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976). 
 20. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 21. Id. at 231–32. 
 22. See infra Parts II.A, B. 
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Supreme Court’s recent Matrixx decision.23 Is significance (or has it become) simply 
synonymous with materiality in the context of disclosure decisions under Rule 10b-
5? If not, how is it distinguished? Is its usage simply a consequence of the occasional 
inadequacy of language? 
So too, the very vantage point from which we view materiality, and perhaps 
significance, and what constitutes each, lies at the heart of Rule 10b-5 actions and 
securities law policy generally.24 In deciding whether and exactly how much to 
disclose, materiality, and perhaps significance, may be determined ex ante, but it 
can only be verified as correctly made ex post facto, and then it is fraught with bias 
and unfairness. The very phrasing and tense of the guiding language from Basic 
(“would have been”) captures this ex post retrospection to the ex ante decision and 
encapsulates the difficulty of judging that decision fairly.25 Therefore, our look at 
significance and materiality requires us to grapple with the ex ante versus ex post 
problem inherent in finding materiality. 
Moreover, because the role of materiality is also essential in Basic’s finding that 
the element of reliance may be assumed in causation with the adoption of the 
fraud-on-the-market theory and because the ex post factor is also palpable in that 
analysis,26 we consider the ex ante versus ex post problem with materiality in 
applying the fraud-on-the-market theory and the closely allied efficient capital 
markets hypothesis. 
A. Forms of “Significant” 
1. Basic, TSC, and Mills 
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision on materiality under Rule 10b-5, Basic v. 
Levinson, pertained to pre-merger negotiations and the determination of when 
information about such negotiations constitutes material information necessary to 
be disclosed under the “significantly” altering the “total mix” of information 
standard.27 While the Court sought to resolve a split in the circuits over the 
relatively narrow issue of pre-merger talks, Basic subsequently became the primary 
 
 23. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011). 
 24. For a discussion of the SEC’s historic treatment of the materiality element in 10b-5 actions; albeit 
focusing on the PSLRA, forward looking statements and the bespeaks caution doctrine, see Hugh C. Beck, The 
Substantive Limits of Liability for Inaccurate Predictions, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 161 (2007); E.C. Lashbrooke, Jr., The 
Alternative-Action Requirement: The Derailment of Santa Fe, 1981 DUKE L.J. 963, 972 (1981) (“Since the 
inception of an implied civil cause of action for a violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 . . . the test for 
materiality has ranged from a realistic view to a reasonable man standard to a marketplace effects test.”). For a 
negative view of the importance of materiality, see Stefan J. Padfield, Immaterial Lies: Condoning Deceit in the 
Name of Securities Regulation, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 143 (2010). 
 25. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 231–32 (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
 26. See id. at 241–47. 
 27. Id. at 232–33. 
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word on materiality for Rule 10b-5 situations generally, importing the standard 
from disputes in the section 14 proxy context.28 
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,29 the predecessor to Basic, provided the 
Court in Basic with case law on materiality in the proxy voting rights context that 
helped flesh out Rule 10b-5.30 
The question of materiality, it is universally agreed, is an objective one, 
involving the significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a 
reasonable investor. Variations in the formulation of a general test of 
materiality occur in the articulation of just how significant a fact must be 
or, put another way, how certain it must be that the fact would affect a 
reasonable investor’s judgment.31 
TSC thus appears to treat significance as, at least in part, a definition, if not an 
actual synonym, of materiality, and requires judgment of decisions as to the 
certainty that information will impact reasonable investors’ decisions.32 That the 
TSC Court addressed Section 14(a)33 and Rule 14a-934 does not distinguish the 
weight of the discussion as it is the most heavily relied upon precedent in Basic.35 
The Basic Court drew from TSC, “[a]s we clarify today, materiality depends on the 
significance the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented 
information.”36 
 
 28. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (evaluating the materiality definition 
specifically within the context of the proxy rules created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §14(a)); see also 
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (considering whether the causal nature between a materially 
false and misleading statement and the resultant merger gives rise to a cause of action based on the violation of 
the proxy rules in § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 29. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
 30. See Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); see also Thomas M. Madden, Causation in Private 
Civil Actions by Minority Shareholders Under Proxy Provisions of § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C.A. § 78n(a)) and Securities Exchange Act (SEC) Rules Thereunder—Post Virginia Bankshares, 137 A.L.R. 
Fed. 293 (1997) (giving examples of how the “essential link” test—established by Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite 
Co.— was used in other proxy cases to determine whether material misrepresentations and the ensuing actions 
taken by minority shareholders gave rise to a cause of action under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934). 
 31. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 445 (emphasis added). 
 32. See generally Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The Case for Replacing “the Reasonable 
Investor” with “the Least Sophisticated Investor” in Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L. REV. 473 (2006) (arguing for a 
new standard replacing the reasonable investor—to accommodate the underclass). 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (2012). 
 34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2011). 
 35. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (“We now expressly adopt the TSC Industries 
standard of materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context.”). 
 36. Id. at 240 (emphasis added). 
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It is instructive to look carefully at the language from TSC because of its 
continued reach. While the language focuses on materiality in the context of proxy 
voting under Section 14, its rationale was directly adopted to the Section 10 and 
Rule 10b-5 context and has remained there ever since.37 Yet, we can understand the 
seminal materiality language better still if we consider the main resource for TSC—
the earlier Section 14 decision, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co..38 
Mills set out clear policy motivation for the materiality standard it applied: 
Doubts as to the critical nature of information misstated or omitted will be 
commonplace. And particularly in view of the prophylactic purpose of the 
Rule and the fact that the content of the proxy statement is within 
management’s control, it is appropriate that these doubts be resolved in 
favor of those the statute is designed to protect.39 
In rejecting a lower court standard of materiality turning on what information a 
reasonable investor “might consider important,” TSC further cautioned that: 
Some information is of such dubious significance that insistence on its 
disclosure may accomplish more harm than good. The potential liability for 
a Rule 14a-9 violation can be great indeed, and if the standard of 
materiality is unnecessarily low, not only may the corporation and its 
management be subjected to liability for insignificant omissions or 
misstatements, but also management’s fear of exposing itself to substantial 
liability may cause it simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of 
trivial information—a result that is hardly conducive to informed 
decisionmaking.40 
Justice Marshall explained, 
The question of materiality, it is universally agreed, is an objective one, 
involving the significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a 
reasonable investor. Variations in the formulation of a general test of 
materiality occur in the articulation of just how significant a fact must be 
 
 37. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
 38. 396 U.S. 375 (1970). 
 39. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448 (citing Mills, 396 U.S. at 385). 
 40. Id. at 448–49 (emphasis added); id. at 445 (rejecting Court of Appeals standard that material facts 
include “facts which a reasonable investor might consider important”). 
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or, put another way, how certain it must be that the fact would affect a 
reasonable investor’s judgment.41 
In perhaps the most influential passage in TSC, again referring heavily to Mills, 
Marshall wrote, 
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a 
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to 
vote. This standard is fully consistent with Mills’ general description of 
materiality as a requirement that “the defect have a significant propensity 
to affect the voting process.” It does not require proof of a substantial 
likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the 
reasonable investor to change his vote. What the standard does contemplate 
is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, 
the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the 
deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must be 
a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have 
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 
“total mix” of information made available.42 
This language transitions to a much more consistent use of significant and forms of 
significant in place of important—a usage that at least some courts have 
subsequently closely adhered to—even if modified to the nuanced usage and the 
facts of subsequent circuit court cases.43 
The Basic court recognized the bright-line possibility and explicitly rejected it.44 
A bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than a standard that requires 
the exercise of judgment in the light of all the circumstances. But ease of 
application alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the securities 
acts and Congress’ policy decisions. Any approach that designates a single 
fact or occurrence as always determinative of an inherently fact-specific 
 
 41. Id. at 445 (emphasis added). 
 42. Id. at 449 (emphasis added). 
 43. See Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Phan, 500 F.3d 895, 908 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The antifraud provisions’ 
materiality element is satisfied only if there is ‘a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact 
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information 
available.” (quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449)); see also In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.–Taj Mahal 
Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 369 (3d Cir. 1993) (“The Supreme Court in TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc. . . . , defined 
materiality within the proxy-solicitation context of § 14(a) of the 1934 Act. Subsequently the Court expressly 
made the TSC standard applicable in actions under § 10 and Rule 105-b . . . , and we have made it applicable as 
well in claims under §§ 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act. . . .” (internal citations omitted)). 
 44. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988). 
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finding such as materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or 
underinclusive.45 
In addressing the split between the Second Circuit’s probability magnitude test and 
the Sixth Circuit’s agreement in principle approach, the Supreme Court left us with 
the circularity of its significance language.46 
2. General Usage 
In general usage outside of the legal context, “material” is defined, in part, as 
“having significance or relevance;” “of serious or substantial import; significant, 
important, of consequence.”47 In general usage within a legal context, “material” is 
defined as “significant or influential.”48 “Significant” is similarly defined as 
“sufficiently great or important to be worthy of attention; noteworthy; 
consequential, influential.”49 So it is reasonable to consider material and significant 
to be synonyms in general usage. 
3. Circuit Court Usage 
In the circuit court decisions discussed, infra, as in the Supreme Court’s Matrixx, 
courts continued to use Basic as the precedent for deriving a materiality definition 
and substantiated it by either explicitly or implicitly citing TSC, and even Mills.50 
Certain uses of significant by the circuit courts are nearly synonymous with 
material’s general usage, but do not illuminate any clear standard of materiality.51 
Some uses applied by the circuit courts in key decisions on Rule 10b-5 appear, on 
their face, to be summarily tautological.52 Other uses are more nuanced, or pertain 
more specifically to fact contexts of the 10b-5 cases.53 To fully comprehend the 
meaning of significant qua material, we need to look more closely at these courts’ 
usage. 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 240. 
 47. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com (last visited Jan. 17, 2015). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See infra notes 54–116 and accompanying text. 
 51. See, e.g., Hill v. Gozani, 683 F.3d 40, 57 (1st Cir. 2011); Miss. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Boston Scientific 
Corp., 649 F.3d 5, 20–21 (1st Cir. 2011); Castellano v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 257 F.3d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 52. See, e.g., In re Aetna Sec. Litig., 617 F.3d 272, 283–85 (3d Cir. 2010); Ley v. Visteon Corp., 543 F.3d 801, 
809 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 53. See, e.g., Hill, 638 F.3d at 57; Miss. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 649 F.3d at 20–21; Castellano, 257 F.3d at 181–
82. 
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In Hill v. Gozani54 the First Circuit anticipated Matrixx by emphasizing that 
material information need not be disclosed in all circumstances—even where 
certain facts “demonstrate a significant probability that the noted risks would 
materialize and that the effect of those risks on the company’s future would be 
significant.”55 In Hill, where certain information about the use of fraudulent 
neurology codes and the Medicare 10% rule was not enough to indicate “near 
certainty of ruin” and even where the company had made prior public mention of a 
risk of non-reimbursement by third party payers, the First Circuit found no duty to 
disclose or further expound such information.56 The court looked to the TSC 
materiality standard.57 While the court referred to the information at issue as “not 
insignificant” and “material,” the court’s decision turned on the lack of certainty 
that the information not disclosed in a press release would translate into “failure or 
. . . comprehensive cover-up.”58 This usage of significant may apply a higher 
threshold finding of materiality than indicated in the Matrixx decision.59 The First 
Circuit’s use of significant is directed at describing the degree of the impact of 
certain information, not necessarily the importance of certain information to 
investors.60 Moreover, the court’s interpretation of an actionable standard of 
materiality appears to require absolute certainty of significance, rather than a lesser 
likelihood—harkening back to the language in TSC. 
The use of material has also been addressed in the context of the close link 
between scienter and materiality among the elements of securities fraud. In 
Mississippi Public Employees’ Retirement System v. Boston Scientific Corp.,61 the First 
Circuit applied Matrixx’s holding, reiterating the Basic standard in rejecting a bright 
line standard that would, in essence, translate statistical significance into 
materiality.62 While the First Circuit did not equate materiality with scienter, it 
pointed to the close relationship with materiality, noting, “knowingly omitting 
material information is probative, although not determinative, of materiality.”63 
Exploring the alleged material misstatements and omissions that might have 
inferred scienter, the court did not find that the defendant had “recklessly created a 
significant risk” that would have required the defendant company to issue a recall 
 
 54. 638 F.3d 40 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 55. Id. at 57 (emphasis added). 
 56. Id. at 59. 
 57. Id. at 57. 
 58. Id. at 59 (emphasis added). 
 59. See Hill v. Gozani, 651 F.3d 151, 152–53 (1st Cir. 2011) (denying rehearing en banc in light of the 
Matrixx decision and reiterating the prior holding). 
 60. See Hill, 638 F.3d at 59. 
 61. 649 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 62. Id. at 20–21. 
 63. Id. at 20 (quoting Miss. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Boston Scientific Corp. (BSC I), 523 F.3d 75, 87 (1st 
Cir. 2008)). 
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of its affected products.64 The First Circuit apparently saw in Matrixx broad 
discretion in finding materiality other than as statistical significance, and employed 
a usage of significance rather more generally characterized as an amount. 
The Second Circuit’s earlier adherence to the bright line statistical significance 
standard on materiality in Carter-Wallace, was clearly repudiated in Matrixx.65 In 
Carter-Wallace I,66 the Second Circuit found that the issuer’s failure to disclose 
deaths relating to the drug it manufactured was not a Rule 10b-5 violation as the 
information “did not become materially misleading until Carter-Wallace had 
information that [the drug] had caused a statistically significant number of . . . 
deaths.”67 The Second Circuit reiterated this conclusion in a subsequent Carter-
Wallace decision.68 
In Castellano v. Young & Rubicam, Inc.,69 the Second Circuit applied the Basic 
and TSC materiality test focusing on ‘probability—magnitude.’70 Here, the Second 
Circuit considered the materiality of merger discussions based upon the probability 
that the merger would occur; “[u]nder the materiality test set out in Basic, the 
potential significance of a merger is considered in light of the likelihood that it will 
occur.”71 This usage of significance is akin to probability. 
In In re Aetna Securities Litigation,72 the Third Circuit applied the materiality 
standard from Basic and TSC (“significantly altering the total mix”) and, yet gave 
no further shrift to significance in its application after citing the standard.73 The 
court’s analysis in determining the materiality of alleged forward looking statements 
about “disciplined pricing” was centered on the vagueness of the pricing claim in 
not finding materiality.74 The court’s usage of significant was simply to recite and 
apply the standard.75 
In SEC v. Snyder,76 an unpublished decision, the Fifth Circuit found that a “jury 
was entitled to find that the prediction of significant shortfalls in the second quarter 
was information that a reasonable investor would have found important.”77 This 
 
 64. Id. at 21 (emphasis added). 
 65. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1319–21 (2011). 
 66. 150 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 67. Id. at 157 (emphasis added). 
 68. In re Carter-Wallace, Inc., Sec. Litig., 220 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 69. 257 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 70. Id. at 185 (relying on Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 
1968)).  
 71. Id. at 181 (emphasis added). 
 72. 617 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 73. Id. at 283–85. 
 74. Id. at 283–84. 
 75. Id. at 283–85. 
 76. 292 F. App’x 391 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 77. Id. at 404. 
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usage of significant involved in the court’s application of the materiality standard 
once again appears to indicate degree, or amount.78 It also shows a linkage between 
significant and important found in the language of Basic and TSC. 
In Ley v. Visteon Corp.,79 the Sixth Circuit applied the Basic and TSC derived 
materiality standard to an allegation that a spin-off of Ford failed to disclose 
material information about its derivation from Ford and its dependent contractual 
relations with Ford.80 Applying the standard, the court opined: “[g]iven that the 
disclosures Plaintiffs propose are merely interpretations drawn from the facts 
presented in the prospectuses [of the spin-off], and do not actually provide new 
information, they would not have ‘significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of the 
information already presented in the prospectuses.’”81 This usage simply cited the 
standard and summarily made a conclusion in accordance with it.82 Such usage 
appears to be definitional or even synonymous.83 
In the unpublished case Saxe v. Dlusky,84 the Sixth Circuit applied the same 
materiality analysis in facts involving a privately negotiated transaction.85 The court 
found, “[b]ased on the professional licenses required to offer professional 
services . . . , [the defendant] did not make a material misrepresentation to [the 
plaintiff in stating his opinion] about the significance of her lack of professional 
licenses.”86 The court looked to Helwig v. Vencor, Inc.,87 applied Basic, and discussed 
the narrow instances where opinion can be actionable under materiality standards 
of 10(b)—where stated opinion is not believed by its speaker and is “not factually 
well-grounded.”88 Here, the application of significance looks to be a direct 
implementation of the TSC derived materiality standard and significant looks to be 
interchangeable with material. 
The Sixth Circuit’s City of Monroe Employees Retirement System v. Bridgestone 
Corp.89 includes ample application of the Basic/TSC standard on materiality 
principally via Helwig and applies it to facts surrounding a declaration of no 
impairment of Bridgestone assets in an annual report.90 Here, the Sixth Circuit 
interchanged its use of significant with important: “[w]e conclude—at a 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. 543 F.3d 801 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 80. Id. at 808–09. 
 81. Id. at 809 (emphasis added).  
 82. Id. at 808–09. 
 83. See id. 
 84. 268 F. App’x 438 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 85. Id. at 439. 
 86. Id. at 442 (emphasis added).  
 87. 251 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 88. Saxe, 268 F. App’x at 441. 
 89. 399 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 90. Id. at 679. 
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minimum—that the probability or reasonable possibility of Firestone’s brand name 
experiencing a significant asset impairment was not information ‘so obviously 
unimportant to a reasonable investor that reasonable minds could not differ on the 
question of [its] unimportance.’”91 
The Eighth Circuit addressed the materiality issue in NECA-IBEW Pension Fund 
v. Hutchinson Technology, Inc.,92 finding that vague statements could not be relied 
upon by reasonable investors: 
[S]ome statements are so vague and such obvious hyperbole that no 
reasonable investor would rely upon them. The role of the materiality 
requirement is not to attribute to investors a childlike simplicity but rather 
to determine whether a reasonable investor would have considered the 
omitted information significant at the time . . . soft, puffing statements 
generally lack materiality because the market price of a share is not inflated 
by vague statements predicting growth. No reasonable investor would rely 
on these statements, and they are certainly not specific enough to perpetrate 
a fraud on the market.93 
Here, the usage of some form of significant and material appear virtually 
interchangeable or synonymous. 
In United States v. Reyes,94 the Ninth Circuit, though in a criminal case and not a 
private action, applied the materiality standard from Basic and TSC to facts 
regarding the misstatement of earnings.95 The court wrote: 
Taking into account the cumulative testimony of the witnesses regarding the 
materiality of the Company’s misstatement of its earnings, coupled with the 
information in the Company’s financial statements and SEC filings, and 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a 
rational jury could find that Brocade’s significantly overstated net income 
and underreported losses were material to investors.96 
This usage describes the degree of inaccuracy of certain information in a manner 
difficult to distinguish from the synonymous use of material itself. 
 
 91. Id. at 679–80 (emphasis added) (citing Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 563 (6th Cir. 2001)). 
 92. 536 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 93. Id. at 960–61(emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 
F.3d 539, 547 (8th Cir. 1997)). 
 94. 660 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 95. Id. at 469. I discuss cases other than private actions where court usage of significant in determining 
materiality is directly on point with the same issue in private actions. 
 96. Id. at 470 (emphasis added) (citing Berson v. Applied Signal Tech., 527 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 Thomas M. Madden 
Vol. 10, No. 2 2015 229 
In SEC v. Global Express Capital Real Estate Investment Fund,97 the Ninth Circuit 
applied Basic and TSC, referencing the need to find that an “omitted fact would 
have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of a reasonable shareholder.”98 
The court stated that, “misstatements and omissions created the false impression 
that Global Capital was profitable, an impression that would have assumed 
significance in the deliberations of any reasonable investor.”99 Here, the usage is a 
direct application of the materiality standard derived though Basic from TSC; yet, 
the linkage between significance and material is apparently a fact based conclusion; 
the addition of “actual” indicating factual verification or conclusion.100 
In Rockies Fund, Inc.,101 the D.C. Circuit applied the Basic/TSC materiality 
language, and employed significant in looking at the misclassification of funds and 
allegedly improper valuation.102 The court almost summarily opined that the 
overvaluation of a fund’s largest asset “would have been significant information for 
potential Fund investors.”103 This usage appears to be conclusory on facts and 
synonymous with materiality. 
The circuit courts, thus, have used forms of significance in determining 
materiality both before and after Matrixx in a range of ways or meanings. We are 
faced, in some instances, with a near tautological use of significance as a definition 
of material;104 as a synonym of material;105 as “actual significance” (apparently 
meeting an at least implied fact-based standard);106 as importance (definitional and 
also at least nearly synonymous);107 as degree or amount and even near certainty or 
probability;108 and, finally, as the recently rejected standard of meeting a statistical 




 97. 289 F. App’x 183 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 98. Id. at 186 (emphasis added) (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
 99. Id. at 187 (emphasis added). 
 100. See id. at 186. 
 101. Rockies Fund, Inc. v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 428 F.3d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  
 102. Id. at 1096–97. 
 103. Id. at 1097 (emphasis added). Similar direct/quoted usage is found in Benzon v. Morgan Stanley 
Distribs., 420 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 104. See, e.g., Ley v. Visteon Corp., 543 F.3d 801, 809 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 105. See, e.g., NECA-IBEW Pension Fund v. Hutchinson Tech., Inc., 536 F.3d 952, 960–61 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 106. See, e.g., Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Global Express Capital Real Estate Inv. Fund, 289 F. App’x 183, 186 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
 107. See, e.g., Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Snyder, 292 F. App’x 391, 404 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 108. See, e.g., Castellano v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 257 F.3d 171, 185 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 109. See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1319 (2011). 
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4. Other Recent U.S. Supreme Court Usage 
Albeit in a distinguishable context, the Supreme Court recently looked at the 
interplay of significant and material in considering the application of the Exchange 
Act to a foreign listed foreign corporation.110 In Robert Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank Ltd.,111 the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a Section 10(b) 
based complaint regarding shares of a foreign corporation traded on a foreign 
exchange, finding that the Exchange Act did not apply to extraterritorial 
transactions.112 In its discussion, the Court considered applying a test of whether 
“‘acts of material importance’ performed in the United States ‘significantly 
contributed’ to [the] result [of losses to US investors abroad].”113 The Court also 
considered the “significant and material conduct” test providing that violation of 
10(b) be found “when the fraud involved significant conduct in the United States 
that is material to the fraud’s success.”114 In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia not 
only found no textual support for the latter test and no reason to apply the prior 
test, but also that the focus of the deception at the heart of the fraud (in the instant 
case, Florida) did not determine the application of the Exchange Act.115 Yet, the 
Court’s very consideration of these tests again supports the near synonymous usage 
of significant and material in the consideration of Section 10(b) violations.116 
B. Matrixx Reduxx 
In Matrixx, of course, the Supreme Court spoke further on significance.117 The 
decision was anticipated as an opportunity to adopt a bright line standard and to 
 
 110. Robert Morrison v. Nat’l Aust. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2886 (2010). 
 111. Id. at 2869.  
 112. Id. at 2883. 
 113. Id. at 2879 (emphasis added). 
 114. Id. at 2886 (emphasis added). 
 115. Id. at 2884. 
 116. See Elizabeth Cosenza, Paradise Lost: § 10(b) after Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 11 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 343, 386 (2011) (“The correct standard for the transnational application of § 10(b) is the one proposed by 
then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan in the Government’s amicus brief to the Supreme Court. Under that 
standard, a transnational securities fraud violates § 10(b) when the fraud involves significant conduct in the US 
that is material to the fraud’s success and that fraud directly caused the plaintiff’s injury. This standard strikes 
the proper balance between advancing § 10(b)’s remedial objectives and conserving the scarce resources of US 
courts and law enforcement authorities for regulation of securities fraud that has a substantial connection to the 
US. The Solicitor General’s standard is also consistent with the presumption against extraterritoriality and the 
Charming Betsy rule, and fits in neatly with the larger mosaic of recent Supreme Court securities fraud 
jurisprudence. . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 117. See Siobhan Innes-Gawn, The Significance of it All: Corporate Disclosure in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. 
Siracusano, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 174 (2011). 
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greatly impact the active and charged realm of pharmaceutical class actions.118 No 
great guidance came forth. No enhanced parsing out of the materiality element 
generally resulted. Justice Sotomayor clarified for us that significance, at least in a 
context concerning the alleged loss of smell, or anosmia, resulting from use of 
certain cold medicine, Zicam (containing zinc), may in fact be found where 
information has “plausibly indicated a reliable causal link” and need not meet a 
standard of “statistical significance.”119 Yet, we are left in essence with broad circuit 
variation on precise definition of materiality.120 This intellectually and practically 
dissatisfying jurisprudence leaves us still with a virtual tautology—materiality as 
significance. 
Matrixx presented a pharmaceutical industry fact scenario where a decision 
regarding the materiality of data about a pharmaceutical product was called into 
question in a class action brought under Rule 10b-5.121 The issue required a decision 
on whether to find a “bright line” rule that statistical significance equated with 
materiality. The Court rejected the bright line rule under Basic’s total mix [standard 
of significance determining materiality], repudiating Carter-Wallace and reasoning, 
“[g]iven that medical professionals and regulators act on the basis of evidence of 
causation that is not statistically significant, it stands to reason that in certain cases 
reasonable investors would as well.”122 The Court went on: 
[T]he mere existence of reports of adverse events—which says nothing in 
and of itself about whether the drug is causing the adverse events—will not 
satisfy this standard. Something more is needed, but that something more is 
not limited to statistical significance and can come from “the source, 
content, and reports[.]”123 
 
 118. William Sullivan et al., Supreme Court Will Examine Materiality in Securities Fraud Class Action Against 
Pharmaceutical Company, in PAUL HASTINGS, STAYCURRENT (July 2010), www.paulhastings.com/assets/publicati 
ons/1647.pdf. 
 119. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318 (2011).  “A study that is statistically 
significant has results that are unlikely to be the result of random error. . . .”  Id. at 1319 n.6 (emphasis added) 
(quoting FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 354 (2d ed. 2000)). 
 120. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing circuit court usage). 
 121. See George A. Mocsary, Statistically Insignificant Deaths: Disclosing Drug Harms to Investors (and 
Patients) Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 111 (2011); Stuart R. Cohn & Erin M. Swick, The Sitting 
Ducks of Securities Class Action Litigation: Bio-Pharmas and the Need for Improved Evaluation of Scientific Data, 
35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 911, 932 (2010) (“The clear clash between the ostensibly objective, numerically based 
standard of the bio-pharma industry and the amorphous standard of the securities laws presents an enormous 
liability risk to the bio-pharmas.”). 
 122. Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1321. 
 123. Id. (emphasis added). 
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So materiality does not equate with a level of statistical significance (or need not be 
pleaded to equate with such a level).124 Materiality may be something other than (or 
be pleaded to be more than) one or more reports of adverse events known to an 
issuer in order for that issuer to be held liable in failing to disclose material 
information under Rule 10b-5. 
Yet, in rejecting a bright line statistical significance standard of materiality, the 
Court went on to use “significant” more generally in considering the pleading: 
Viewing the allegations of the complaint as a whole, the complaint alleges 
facts suggesting a significant risk to the commercial viability of a leading 
product. . . . Assuming the complaint’s allegations to be true, . . . Matrixx 
had information indicating a significant risk to its leading revenue-
generating product.125 
The Court continued to employ “significant” in Matrixx, other than as statistical 
significance, more broadly still, even in directly quoting the language from Basic.126 
“As in Basic, Matrixx’s categorical rule would ‘artificially exclud[e]’ information 
that ‘would otherwise be considered significant to the trading decision of a 
reasonable investor.’”127 This usage goes to the more general “total mix” analysis 
from Basic and TSC outside of the specifics of adverse events known about the drug 
at issue and more generally concerning the impact on those who might be trading 
on the issuer’s securities in the market.128 It appears to call for a fact based 
conclusion directly tied to the Basic/TSC language. It is the essence of the same 
tautological problem found in circuit court usage.129 
Matrixx, while rejecting the statistical significance bright line standard on 
materiality, has simply re-presented synonymous usage of significance practically 
constituting a tautology of significance qua materiality.130 This usage looks back to 
the often recited language of Basic derived from TSC and Mills that we have seen 
repeated in several circuit court opinions, supra.131 It may be the reflection of the 
 
 124. Id. at 1309. 
 125. Id. at 1323 (emphasis added). 
 126. Id. at 1319, 1323. 
 127. Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1318 (emphasis added) (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988)). 
 128. Id. at 1312. 
 129. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing circuit court usage). 
 130. See Matrixx, 131 S. Ct. at 1313. 
 131. See, e.g., Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 547 (8th Cir.1997) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted) (“[S]ome statements are so vague and such obvious hyperbole that no reasonable investor 
would rely upon them. The role of the materiality requirement is not to attribute to investors a 
childlike simplicity but rather to determine whether a reasonable investor would have considered the omitted 
information significant at the time. . . . [S]oft, puffing statements generally lack materiality because the market 
price of a share is not inflated by vague statements predicting growth. No reasonable investor would rely on 
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inevitable fact determinative nature of materiality, explicitly recognized in Basic. 
Yet, more so, it appears to reflect the inadequacy of language or language usage by 
the courts to capture a more measurable definition of materiality.132 
Circuit court usage of significance ranges from this tautological usage to more 
nuanced uses—meaning degree or amount, probability, and even near certainty.133 
The circuit courts’ various use of significance in defining materiality all have clear 
roots in Basic, if not TSC and Mills—witness “actual,” “important,” “substantial 
likelihood” can all be found in these Supreme Court precedents.134 Yet, none 
appears to give us an understanding of “significant” that truly sets it apart from a 
tautological trade off with the element of materiality itself—an element that is 




these statements, and they are certainly not specific enough to perpetrate a fraud on the market.”); Saxe v. 
Dlusky, 268 F. App’x 438, 442 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Based on the professional licenses required to offer professional 
services through PDS Planning and the compensation scheme employed by PDS Planning, Dlusky did not make 
a material misrepresentation to Saxe about the significance of her lack of professional licenses.”). 
 132. Compare United States v. Reyes, 660 F.3d 454, 470 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Taking into account the 
cumulative testimony of the witnesses regarding the materiality of the Company’s misstatement of its earnings, 
coupled with the information in the Company’s financial statements and SEC filings, and viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the Government, a rational jury could find that Brocade’s significantly overstated 
net income and underreported losses were material to investors.”) with SEC v. Snyder, 292 F. App’x 391, 404 
(5th Cir. 2008) (“We held in Fox that the fact that insiders had access to certain forecasts ‘would have supported 
a finding of materiality.’ In the present case, the jury was entitled to find that the predictions of significant 
shortfalls in the second quarter was information that a reasonable investor would have found important.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 133. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 134. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (“The general standard of 
materiality that we think best comports with the policies of Rule 14a-9 is as follows: An omitted fact is material 
if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to 
vote. This standard is fully consistent with Mills’ general description of materiality as a requirement that ‘the 
defect have a significant Propensity to affect the voting process.’ It does not require proof of a substantial 
likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote. 
What the standard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, 
the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put 
another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been 
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made 
available.”). 
 135. See Benzon v. Morgan Stanley Distribs., 420 F.3d 598, 609 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Given that the disclosures 
Plaintiffs propose are merely interpretations drawn from the facts presented in the prospectuses, and do not 
actually provide new information, they would not have significantly altered the total mix of the information 
already presented in the prospectuses.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)); see also Rockies Fund, Inc. 
v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 428 F.3d 1088, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting briefly that the misclassification of funds 
and allegedly improper valuation “would have been significant information for potential Fund investors”). 
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C. Hindsight—The Ex Post Perspective on the Ex Ante Determination 
Part of the challenge of clarifying the usage of significant qua materiality is bound 
up with the ex post/ex ante problem. Judgment by a court occurs after some event 
has led to litigation.136 In an action under Rule 10b-5, that judgment focuses, at least 
in part, on the quality of a decision made to disclose or not disclose certain 
information at a prior time.137 In making 10b-5 determinations, courts must look 
back, if you will, to judge that decision often quite some time after it was made—
with changed knowledge making the decision look quite different.138 This looking 
back is what I am referring to as the ex post perspective on an ex ante 
determination. It is closely allied with a general problem of hindsight, a subset of 
which has been explored as the fraud by hindsight doctrine.139 
For an example of a court’s recognition of the hindsight issue in the securities 
fraud context, consider the Southern District of New York’s In re Sanofi-Aventis 
Securities Litigation.140 The Southern District commented that “[t]he omission of 
facts that may be material or significant by hindsight does not render their omission 
at a prior time misleading. This Court must engage in a statement-by-statement 
analysis to make such a determination at the pleading stage.”141 
Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Donald Langevoort have traced the 
development of the fraud by hindsight doctrine since Judge Friendly’s 1978 Denny 
 
 136. See, e.g., Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 238, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that an editor violated Rule 10b-5 after a promotional email that purported to have information obtained from 
“a senior company executive” claiming to possess a “super insider tip” falsely stated date of sale); see also 
Dolphin & Bradbury, Inc. v. SEC, 512 F.3d 634, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (affirming a finding that an underwriter 
for municipal bonds and its chairman violated Rule 10b-5 as a result of failing to disclose that the Pennsylvania 
Department of Transportation planned to leave the office building when issuing bonds for potential investors). 
 137. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773, 788 
(2004) (“A material event is one that a reasonable investor would consider important. Here, given the 
occurrence of some bad event, the judge has to assess whether a prior warning sign should have been recognized 
(and disclosed). The hindsight problem arises because, once the bad event has occurred, the judge will be biased 
toward finding that the warning should have been disclosed. Courts refer to the information regarding such 
warnings as contingent.”). 
 138. Id. at 774 (“Hindsight blurs the distinction between fraud and mistake. People consistently overstate 
what could have been predicted after events have unfolded–a phenomenon psychologists call the hindsight 
bias. People believe they could have predicted events better than was actually the case and believe that others 
should have been able to predict them. Consequently, they blame others for failing to have foreseen events that 
reasonable people in foresight could not have foreseen. In the context of securities regulation, hindsight can 
mistakenly lead people to conclude that a bad outcome was not only predictable, but was actually predicted by 
managers.” (citations omitted)). 
 139. Id. at 778 (“In cases alleging securities fraud, courts must determine what corporate managers knew 
and when they knew it. Such judgments might be clouded by the present knowledge of how events ultimately 
unfolded. In many contexts, courts have developed adaptations to the problem of judging in hindsight. The 
FBH doctrine might be one such adaptation.” (citations omitted)). 
 140. 774 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 141. Id. at 565 n.15. 
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v. Barber142 opinion and discussed it together with hindsight bias.143 They have 
questioned the role of the fraud by hindsight doctrine as an influence on judges 
debiasing the effect of hindsight, with some particular attention to assessing 
materiality and scienter in securities fraud actions.144 Though their data suggests that 
the doctrine is most often applied to analysis of the scienter element in securities 
fraud actions, Gulati, Rachlinski and Langevoort also found ample discussion of the 
doctrine with regard to the element of materiality.145 Ultimately, in their “quasi-
empirical” study, they found that the doctrine, in practice, is employed as 
justification for an effort to manage the procedure of securities law cases.146 That is, 
the doctrine—prohibiting a finding of fraud by hindsight—is applied by judges as a 
means to exert procedural control over a given case at the early stages of litigation.147 
Relying on Gulati and company’s assessment, then, it appears that the doctrine is 
more of a justification for controlling case process leading to outcome, rather than a 
developed rule applied to substantive facts.148 Indeed, this scholarship concludes  
 
 
 142. Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 143. See Rachlinski, supra note 137, at 796 (“The doctrine originates in 1978 with Judge Friendly’s opinion 
in Denny v. Barber. As with many of the early cases applying the FBH doctrine, Denny involved a bank and 
loans that turned out badly. As part of a securities fraud claim against the bank, plaintiffs alleged that the bank 
had engaged in unsound lending practices, maintained insufficient loan loss reserves, delayed writing off bad 
loans, and undertaken speculative investments. . . . Judge Friendly ruled that merely identifying the disclosure in 
late 1974 was inadequate to show that the defendants had the requisite state of mind in 1973 and early 1974.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 144. Id. at 788 (citations omitted) (“The hindsight bias implicates two distinct elements in securities fraud 
claims: scienter and materiality. Scienter refers to the state of mind the defendant must possess for there to be a 
valid fraud claim under the federal securities laws. . . . A material event is one that a reasonable investor would 
consider important. Here, given the occurrence of some bad event, the judge has to assess whether a prior 
warning sign should have been recognized (and disclosed).”). 
 145. Id. at 790–91 (“This distinction between scienter and materiality thus creates a testable prediction. If 
the FBH doctrine is an attempt to rid securities litigation of the hindsight bias, it should play a more important 
role in assessments of contingent materiality cases than assessments of scienter.
 
In contrast, if case management 
is the true goal of FBH, judges would prefer to attack claims of scienter. If a court finds that no reasonable 
inference of scienter can be made against an individual, the case against that individual ends because the person 
lacked the intent to commit fraud.”). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 785 (“To restate, the case management hypothesis supposes that judges have developed the FBH 
doctrine as an attempt to gain control over securities fraud cases. The reference to the biasing effects of 
hindsight might thus provide only the ostensible justification for departing from the open notice pleading 
system laid down in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather than as a careful effort to control bias, judges 
are using the real influence of the hindsight bias as a pretext for judging cases on the merits early in the 
litigation process.”). 
 148. See id. at 782 (“Despite appearances, it might be unrealistic to suppose that judges have developed this 
clever adaptation to resolve a psychological phenomenon. Instead, the references to hindsight might be little 
more than a pretext for legitimizing greater judicial control over securities fraud cases filed in federal court. The 
FBH doctrine might not really be a well-developed adaptation, but might serve merely as a judging ‘heuristic’ or 
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that the doctrine has been without any substantive development in the case law.149 
Jeffrey Rachlinski has previously considered in some further depth the nature of 
hindsight in assessing decision-making among judges.150 Rachlinski’s scholarship 
convincingly asserts that, 
[i]n hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been 
anticipated in foresight. They not only tend to view what has happened as 
having been inevitable, but also to view it as having appeared ‘relatively 
inevitable’ before it happened. People believe that others should have been 
able to anticipate events much better than was actually the case.151 
How does this prevalence of hindsight bias among our judges impact the 
possibility of making fair assessments of decisions on disclosure under Rule 10b-
5—i.e. judicial decisions—which must have been made ex ante and not biased by ex 
post knowledge? 
After specifically looking at courts’ treatment of federal securities law issued and 
“fraud by hindsight,” Rachlinski notes that “[t]he federal courts have adopted a 
particularly vigorous prohibition against liability based solely on hindsight in cases 
alleging violations of federal securities laws.”152 In reviewing securities fraud cases, 
he focuses on the heightened pleading standards under the PSLRA. He concludes, 
more generally, that courts do not utilize any generic debiasing strategy, but may 
have particular mechanisms for reducing or accommodating the bias.153 The PSLRA 
legislation was an attempt to address the awareness of the difficulty of judging 
securities fraud and to mitigate against the ease of bringing frivolous suits.154 
 
‘shortcut’ that allows judges to sort what they perceive to be plausible and frivolous cases early in the litigation 
process.”). 
 149. Id. at 813. 
 150. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 
572 (1998) (citing two prior studies, Rachlinski argues that hindsight bias is prevalent in the United States 
judicial system). 
 151. Id. (citation omitted). 
 152. Id. at 616. For more on this, Rachlinski cites Brian D. Hufford, Deterring Fraud vs. Avoiding the “Strike 
Suit”: Reaching an Appropriate Balance, 61 BROOK L. REV. 593, 605–06 (1995) and Robert A. Prentice & John H. 
Langmore, Beware of Vaporware: Product Hype and the Securities Fraud Liability of High-Tech Companies, 8 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 25 (1994). 
 153. Rachlinski, supra note 150, at 616 (“The federal courts have adopted a particularly vigorous prohibition 
against liability based solely on hindsight in cases alleging violations of the federal securities laws. To win a 
federal securities case, a plaintiff must allege and prove that a defendant has intentionally misrepresented 
material facts about a publicly traded company in an effort to defraud investors. As in all fraud cases, in order to 
survive a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 9(b), plaintiffs must make additional allegations of specific 
instances of intended fraud.”). 
 154. See Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 
914 (2003) (“In 1995 Congress set out to fix securities class action litigation when it passed the Private Securities 
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Notwithstanding Rachlinski’s recognition of the attempted mitigation, the body 
of his work leaves us unconvinced that federal courts judging decisions on 
disclosure in private rights of action under Rule 10b-5 are assessing, or can assess, 
those decisions on disclosure truly as made ex-ante. Rather, his data, together with 
others’ related work, seems to suggest that some disturbing percentage of judicial 
decisions on fraud (and other issues) turn, in large part, on hindsight bias—the ex 
post reality that makes the ex ante decision at issue seem much clearer upon ex post 
judicial assessment.155 
On this ex post/ex ante notion, the element of materiality is at a nexus with the 
elements of reliance and causation with the fraud-on-the-market theory.156 While 
this much discussed and increasingly discredited theory157 is currently before the 
Court again in Halliburton, we are presently concerned with it only as it ties to our 
more general discussion of materiality.158 
In a fraud-on-the-market case, materiality is the other side of the same coin 
as reliance. Information that is not material does not affect the stock price 
or expected returns and so would not cause a reasonable investor to buy or 
sell a security. In other words, plaintiffs who cannot prove materiality 
cannot prove transaction causation. Under a fraud-on-the-market theory, 
transaction causation and reliance are collapsed; in an efficient market it is 
 
Litigation Reform Act (the PSLRA, the Act, or the Reform Act). The Reform Act was designed to address a 
number of perceived abuses in these cases. In large part, its solution was to create a series of procedural hurdles 
that make it more difficult for plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring and maintain nonmeritorious securities fraud class 
actions.”). 
 155. Rachlinski, supra note 150, at 588. See also Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market 
Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639, 644–46 (1996) (discussing the implications of the hindsight bias to the 
assessment of scienter in securities fraud cases); Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges 
Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does – Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 
EMORY L.J. 83, 127–28 (2002). 
 156. See Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral Finance, 31 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 455, 507 (2006). 
 157. See James D. Cox, Understanding Causation in Private Securities Lawsuits: Building on Amgen, 66 VAND. 
L. REV. 1719, 1728–31 (2013) (“Because there are no reliable models for determining the ‘correct’ price of a 
security, it is not possible to determine whether all information, or even some information, is fully and rapidly 
impounded into a security’s price. . . . Today, there is less clarity regarding the prescriptive qualities of the 
efficient market hypothesis.  It remains a hypothesis, but one that is greatly qualified.”). In his discussion, Cox 
cites Victor L. Bernard, Christine Botosan & Gregory D. Phillips, Challenges to Efficient Market Hypothesis: 
Limits to the Applicability of Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 73 NEB. L. REV. 781, 782–84 (1994) and Ronald J. 
Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 584–89 (1984). 
 158. Booth discusses materiality both in terms of a reasonable investor and having a price impact vital in 
applying the fraud-on-the-market theory.  Booth, supra note 1, at 520–21.  He also notes that many circuit 
courts conflate the two meanings.  Id. at 553. 
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presumed that an investor would not knowingly buy a security at a price 
higher than its true value.159 
The elements of reliance, causation and materiality, then, are inextricably linked, 
particularly when applying the fraud-on-the-market theory. 
The fraud-on-the-market doctrine helped make material information mean 
essentially the same thing as information that was likely to change the 
market price. In terms of giving management guidance on what to say, this 
meant that management could omit details that would not affect the price 
of its stock. One problem with this rule is that there is an expected, or ex 
ante effect versus an ex post effect. Management may legitimately believe 
that information it did not report would have no effect on their employer’s 
stock price only to be surprised by a price decline upon its disclosure.160 
Assuming efficient markets under the efficient capital markets hypothesis 
(“ECMH”), once the market price has moved subsequent to disclosure, are we still 
able to judge the materiality or the related significance of information factored into 
the disclosure decision fairly, as though we do not have any altering subsequent 
knowledge as to how the market or stock price actually did or did not move? The 
hindsight problem is a real one in defining materiality in a meaningful way that sets 
a measurable standard.161 Materiality as significance is not enough. The reach of this 
tautological problem is so broad that it enters into the reliance and causation 
elements and further erodes the ECMH.162 
In Basic, the Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he idea of a free and open public 
market is built upon the theory that competing judgments of buyers and sellers as 
to the fair price of a security brings [sic] about a situation where the open market 
price reflects as nearly as possible a just price.”163 This belief in the market achieving 
 
 159. Dunbar, supra note 156, at 507. 
 160. Id. at 511 (emphasis added). 
 161. Rachlinski, supra note 137, at 816 (“In cases in which contingent materiality is an issue (essentially all 
cases in which materiality is an issue in dispute), the contemporaneous evidence that courts assert they must 
assess is precisely the evidence that the hindsight bias will influence. The unripe information that plaintiffs 
allege to be material is always contemporary and hence always fair game for the courts to consider.”). 
 162. Dunbar, supra note 156, at 469 (“Because material information is defined as information that would 
affect the transaction decision, if that information is impounded in a stock price, then the stock price itself 
provides the evidence as to whether the information would generally affect transaction decisions. As has been 
noted by various courts, under the efficient market theory, materiality and transaction causation often blend 
together: if a stock price is statistically different from where it would be in the absence of fraud, then the 
relevant information was both material to the price and can be presumed to have caused the transactions at that 
price.”). 
 163. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988).  The Basic Court cited studies referenced in In re LTV 
Secs. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 144 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities 
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a “just price” is the assumption of the ECMH built into the fraud-on-the-market-
theory.164 
Indeed, the Basic Court explained, 
[w]e need not determine by adjudication what economists and social 
scientists have debated through the use of sophisticated statistical analysis 
and the application of economic theory. For purposes of accepting the 
presumption of reliance in this case, we need only believe that market 
professionals generally consider most publicly announced material 
statements about companies, thereby affecting stock market prices.165 
We should keep in mind, however, that the presumption of reliance can be rebutted 
by a rather low threshold showing that “severs the link” between a disclosed 
misrepresentation and resultant price or decision to trade.166 
Since Basic, federal courts have conflated the Rule 10b-5 reliance element with 
causation as assumed in the adoption of the fraud-on-the-market theory and the 
ECMH, such that if market prices move in reaction to disclosure, reliance may be 
assumed.167 Here, of course, our concern is not with the element of reliance, but 
with materiality, and our discussion of the fraud-on-the-market theory is 
conducted with only materiality in mind. 
 
Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 4 n.9 (1982) (citing literature on efficient-
capital-market theory); and Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the 
Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 374 n.1, 375–81 (1984). 
 164. See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 153 
(2009) (“[The] fact-specific, ex post emphasis on assessing importance to the reasonable investor has been 
followed faithfully by the lower courts [since Basic], though critics still carp at its indeterminacy.” (citations 
omitted)); see also Dennis, supra note 163, at 419 (“The legal test of materiality is consistent with this Article’s 
suggested approach. Both TSC Industries and the efficient market model recognize that investors react to a total 
mix of information. The model quantifies the total mix concept. The price signaling mechanism represents the 
transmittal of a complete information set of publicly available data.”); Richard C. Sauer, The Erosion of the 
Materiality Standard in the Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws, 62 BUS. LAW. 317, 323–24 (2007) (noting 
that stock prices will change when investors receive material information). 
 165. Basic, 485 U.S. at 247 n.24. 
 166. Id. at 248 (“Any showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price 
received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price, will be sufficient to rebut the 
presumption of reliance. For example, if petitioners could show that the ‘market makers’ were privy to the truth 
about the merger discussions here with Combustion, and thus that the market price would not have been 
affected by their misrepresentations, the causal connection could be broken: the basis for finding that the fraud 
had been transmitted through market price would be gone.”). 
 167. Dunbar, supra note 156, at 458 (“The fraud-on-the-market theory left these requirements intact, but 
allowed for a presumption of reliance if the security traded in an efficient market. The reasoning behind this . . . 
was that all investors rely on the market price when making a purchase decision, so that if the market price 
reflected the effects of an omission or misstatement, then every investor could be presumed to have relied on 
information that incorporated that omission or misstatement.”). 
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One manner in which to attempt a fair assessment of materiality ex post is to 
look at market reaction to disclosed information through an “event study.”168 
Findings of abnormal returns in event studies are checked against statistical 
significance to determine the impact of chance or patterns on market pricing versus 
the disclosed information.169 Macey and company argue that market reaction should 
be measured regardless of market efficiency or inefficiency, though Basic limits the 
reliance presumption in the fraud-on-the-market theory to the context of efficient 
markets —adopting the ECMH.170 
Deciding whether or what to disclose post-Basic, assuming efficient markets, 
requires an ex ante decision as to what will move those efficient markets. It is akin 
to assessing whether the information at issue is likely to have a measurable effect on 
the market.171 Though it is bound up with the reliance and causation elements 
involved in the fraud-on-the-market theory, we can view this, again, as a decision 
about materiality. How can we fairly judge that an ex ante decision as to what will 
move the markets after the disclosure or nondisclosure, after a stock price has or 
has not moved? 
In In re Merck & Co. Securities Litigation,172 the Third Circuit wrestled with the 
application of the efficient market hypothesis in considering the plaintiff’s 
allegation that change in market price “dropped significantly” in reaction to press 
attention to accounting practices relating to the wholly owned subsidiary Merck 
was spinning off in an IPO, and found that Merck’s disclosures or lack of disclosure 
did not leave “every analyst in the dark.”173 While the court delved into the 
materiality definition under its Section 11 discussion, its analysis is germane to 
Section 10(b): “in efficient markets materiality is defined as ‘information that alters 
 
 168. See Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the 
Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017, 1029 (1991) (“The idea behind event studies is simple. To test 
whether and how much a stock price has reacted to news, the researcher examines to what extent the return on 
the stock in the period when the market receives the news (the actual return) differs from what the return 
would have been without the news (the predicted return).”). 
 169. Id. 
 170. See id. at 1027 (“Capital markets are almost surely inefficient. The market-efficiency hypothesis, that 
security prices fully reflect all available information, is an extreme null hypothesis, a point on a continuum, and 
so almost surely false. The interesting task is not to accept or reject market efficiency but to measure the extent 
to which the behavior of returns departs from its predictions. We can then make informed judgments about the 
scenarios where market efficiency is a good approximation and those where some other model is a better 
simplifying view of the world.” (citations omitted)). 
 171. Rachlinski, supra note 150, at 572 (“The [hindsight] bias can cause judges and juries to find liable even 
those defendants who attempted to avoid negligence by undertaking all reasonable precautions in foresight. Not 
only does this seem unjust, but it also might have adverse economic consequences. Any potential defendant 
who is aware of the implications of the hindsight bias might try to avoid liability by taking an excess of 
precautions. The hindsight bias thus suggests a problem with the law and economics of negligence.”). 
 172. 432 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 173. Id. at 268–71. 
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the price of the firm’s stock.’”174 The court reached this conclusion in two steps. 
First, the court noted that “reasonable investors” are the market.175 Second, 
information that is important to the market will be reflected in the stock’s price.176 
Thus, “information important to reasonable investors . . . is immediately 
incorporated into stock prices.”177 The court further noted that the change in stock 
price could be looked at “post hoc.”178 The use of significant, here, assesses the move 
in the market. It really refers to an amount. 
Perhaps the most criticized aspect of the fraud-on-the-market theory is that it 
assumes efficient markets.179 Many have taken issue with this assumption—at least 
with the form of it adopted in Basic180—with some more recent substantive criticism 
of it coming from behavioral economists.181 
[T]he real question is whether the theories developed in behavioral finance 
present specific reasons why material news and significant stock price 
movements should not be considered as mirror images of one another. [I]n 
an efficient market, one can measure the value that some information has 
to the average market participant by measuring the change in stock price 
caused when that information is revealed to the market. Because the stock 
price is the present value of future cash flows in an efficient market, changes 
 
 174. Id. at 274. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. (“If a company’s stock trades on an efficient market, we measure materiality under the 
Burlington (as ratified in Oran) standard. Thus, ‘the materiality of disclosed information may be measured post 
hoc by looking to the movement, in the period immediately following disclosure, of the price of the firm’s 
stock.’”). 
 179. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 168, at 1027 (“The market-efficiency hypothesis, that security prices fully 
reflect all available information, is an extreme null hypothesis, a point on a continuum, and so almost surely 
false.”). 
 180. See id. at 1018 (“We suggest that the focus of the Supreme Court’s holding in Basic is misplaced: what 
determines whether investors were justified in relying on the integrity of the market price is not the efficiency of 
the relevant market but rather whether a misstatement distorted the price of the affected security.”). 
 181. See, e.g., Dunbar, supra note 156, at 507; Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor 
Governance, 59 WASH & LEE L. REV. 767, 769 (2002) (“Recently, a subdiscipline of behavioral economics has 
blossomed, enervating the thirty-year-old tenets of the efficient market story. Called behavioral finance, this 
discipline rests on two foundations. The first holds that a substantial amount of stock pricing is performed by 
investors who do not accurately perceive underlying business values and hence produce prices that do not 
reflect those values. Investor sentiment, rather than rational economic calculation, contributes significantly to 
price formation.”); Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud 
Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 170 (2000) (drawing on Max Bazerman’s concept of selective perception); 
Robert Prentice, Wither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 
1397, 1399 (2002) (criticizing Choie’s desire to refocus regulation on investors rather than market 
professionals). 
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in the expected level of those cash flows will impact the stock price, while 
news that does not matter to investors’ views about cash flows will not 
impact the stock price. Thus, there is a direct link between what is material 
to an investor and the way that a stock price responds to a disclosure of 
information in an efficient market. Unfortunately, that link does not 
necessarily hold if the market is not efficient.182 
Thus, the ex post/ex ante problem resides as well with assessing decisions about 
disclosure based upon the likelihood that that information will affect the efficient 
market. While this assessment links primarily to causation and reliance, it in 
essence invokes a materiality analysis as to market affect.183 Judging any ex ante 
decision on disclosure is difficult to isolate after the ex post market movement or 
lack of movement has occurred.184 Significance may enter into this conundrum, 
with materiality assessing the significance and/or materiality of market 
movement.185 Indeed, the standard cited in Merck is difficult to comprehend other 
than as an entirely ex post judgment that retroactively determines materiality at the 




 182. Dunbar, supra note 156, at 507–08. 
 183. See id. at 468 (“[O]ne can ask the economic question of how a change in investors’ decisions to trade at 
a given price could be observed. The straightforward answer is that if the information would cause more 
investors to want to buy at a particular price, the previous supply-and-demand equilibrium would be upset and 
the price would have to rise until the demand for the stock once again equaled its supply. This, of course, says 
that materially positive news causes a stock’s price to rise. If the information is not material, then investors’ 
decisions to buy or not are unaffected, and the previous supply-and-demand equilibrium will still hold. 
Therefore, there is an economic equivalence between information material to investors’ decisions to buy and 
sell and the price of a security.”). 
 184. Id. at 508 n.199 (“If underreaction is a general phenomenon, then news that will ultimately impact the 
stock’s price may sometimes turn out to have an understated impact in the short run, with the implication that 
some material news will have such an understated impact that the associated price movement is not statistically 
significant. Therefore, by examining only the short-run impact of the response to certain news, one would 
erroneously misclassify some material information as immaterial. To the extent that there is short-run 
overreaction, then the reverse would be true: some news that is generally immaterial would be erroneously 
classified as material by looking at the excessive short-run price movement.”). 
 185. Id. at 509 (“The other half of the story is the possibility that immaterial information causes a sharp 
decline in the price of an individual stock or an entire sector of securities. The definition of immaterial 
information in this analysis is that it is already known or, as before, it does not have a statistically significant 
effect on stock price in an efficient market. When the market is not efficient, however, the normal conditions 
for interpreting the valuation component of an event study are not present. If investors are not basing their 
price forecast on future cash flows alone, but instead they are, for example, herding after others or responding 
to momentum in the price, immaterial information about the issuer of the security may well have a significant 
effect on the price.”). 
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III. Conclusion 
Materiality is an element of crucial importance in finding violations of Rule 10b-
5.186 The Supreme Court’s Matrixx decision rejected a bright line standard equating 
statistical significance with materiality, and in doing so, passed not only on an 
opportunity to define a bright line standard apropos of statistics in pharmaceutical 
class actions, but also on the opportunity to provide more than a tautological 
definition of the element of materiality generally.187 Other Supreme Court and 
circuit court usage of significance indicates that significance, while a term central in 
case law defining materiality, has essentially been employed tautologically, with 
only some nuance.188 
Circuit court usage of significance ranges from that of pure definition or 
synonym; to meanings of importance, degree or amount, near certainty, probability 
and fact based actual significance—all uses having a clear lineage in Basic and back 
to TSC and Mills.189 Matrixx has reinforced the legitimacy of this general usage, but 
has not furthered any clarity in such usage.190 Until further clarity comes, usage of 
significance is likely to be recited in finding materiality, but remains tautological 
and subject to conclusory judicial finding. 
The concern with ex post judgment on assessing the legality of ex ante disclosure 
or non-disclosure under Rule 10b-5 is a concern that many understand to be 
inherent in the nature of the elements of a 10b-5 private action.191 This problem is 
not likely to go away. Nor is it likely to be solved by the usage of forms of 
significance in finding materiality. 
This discussion should call to our attention the use and the limits of language, 
particularly forms of significance, in fleshing out the rather amorphous element of 
materiality. Perhaps it may also contribute to greater care in avoiding the pitfalls of 
hindsight and applications of the fraud-on-the-market theory with greater attention 
to the ex post/ex ante problem. 
We could do better by emphasizing the probability magnitude test component to 
the standard set out in Basic. This affirmed portion of the circuit court split that 
Basic addressed seems to have been slighted, if not buried, by the use of significance 
and the ubiquitous “reasonable investor” “total mix” language.192 
 
 186. See supra Part II.A. 
 187. See supra Part II.B. 
 188. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 189. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 190. See supra Part II.B. 
 191. See supra Part II.C. 
 192. See supra Part II.A.3. 
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The Second Circuit’s In re ProShares Trust Securities Litigation,193 together with a 
few other circuit opinions, which have made at least a passing reference to the 
test,194 show that emphasizing the probability magnitude language better captures 
the predictive notion of ex ante decision making about what is material and what 
need be disclosed. 
We need a standard more measurable than “significant.” Rather than offering a 
mere tautology, a re-emphasis of the probability magnitude test phrasing would 
give better guidance and would direct the courts toward a careful assessment of 
facts that would contribute toward developing a more definite ex ante, if not bright 
line, standard. 
 
 193. 889 F. Supp. 2d 644, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 728 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2013).  See also Stratte-McClure v. 
Morgan Stanley, No. 13–0627–CV, 2015 WL 136312, at *7 (3d Cir. Jan. 12, 2015) (finding that in a securities 
fraud claim the plaintiff must allege, in part, that the omitted information was material under Basic’s 
probability/magnitude test). 
 194. See supra Part II.A.3. 
